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ABSTRACT 
We study the role of prestige and social networks in the selection of outside directors, and the 
subsequent effect on firm value. Both prestige and social networks may act as barriers to good 
corporate governance, as merit based candidates might be disadvantaged when compared to 
candidates with a similar social background to the incumbent board. Using a unique database of 
U.K. directors, Lord or Sir titles (one of the proxies we use for prestige) and networks, we find 
evidence of such self-selection amongst outside directors that hold the same title. Contrary to 
popular suspicion, appointments of prestigious outside directors have no effect on firm value, 
with the exception of appointments to very large boards. We find that titled directors are more 
likely to hold more directorships, and retire later from their positions. In addition to prestige, a 
director's professional qualifications and higher education are positively related to the number of 
directorships they hold. We find no evidence that a shared social network or prestige of outside 
directors is contrary to shareholder interests.  
                                                 
1 Tom Kirchmaier is at the Financial Markets Group, LSE and Manchester Business School. Michael Kollo is at the 
London School of Economics. We would like to thank Antoine Faure-Grimaud, Charles Goodhart, Paul Jackson, 
Bob Nobay, Sir Geoffrey Owen, David Webb and David Yermack. Many thanks also to Parul Gupta and Zeynep 
Polat for excellent research assistance.  
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“The company promoter wants a man whose name will appeal to the public and who does not know 
too much about the business. The name will attract capital – the company promoter will do the rest”  
 
Lord Justice Scrutton in the 1932 UK Court of Appeal judgment on Combined Pulp and Paper 
Mills Ltd  
 
 
 
Despite the lack of direct evidence linking board structure to firm value, policy makers on both 
sides of the Atlantic have, over recent years, worked on improving both the quality and 
proportion of outside (non-executive) directors. The importance of boards and outside directors 
was discussed as early as 1983 by Fama and Jensen (p. 314) who saw boards as “the top-level 
court of appeals of the internal agent market…”, where “the outside board members act as 
arbiters in disagreements among internal managers and carry out tasks that involve serious 
agency problems…”.2 As accomplished and prestigious individuals, these outside directors carry 
a combination of attributes including prior experience, access to social networks and prestige 
that may help them in the nomination process and make them attractive to boards of directors. 
While the role of prior board and CEO experience is well documented in the market for outside 
directors (see for example Fich, 2005), the role of prestige and access to social circles has largely 
been neglected by the literature to date. This is due to two main reasons. First, there is little 
economic theory to guide empirical researchers as to the value or cost to organizations of social 
networks represented on the board of directors. The existing theory outlines the role of outside 
(independent) directors as ‘efficient’ monitors of the management who are themselves free of 
agency conflicts. Second, memberships of prestigious social circles are often not publicized and 
difficult to identify empirically. The empirical tests that link social networks to education face 
additional difficulties in differentiating between the effect of ability and that of prestige. 
 
We address this gap in the literature by using a uniquely detailed database of U.K. non-executive 
directors that allows us to identify and study prestigious peer groups and networks in the market 
for outside directorships. We ask the questions: Does prestige matter in the selection of outside 
directors of firms? Does election of prestigious outside director impact firm value? How 
important a role does prestige play in shaping the allocation and distribution of outside 
directorships? We address these questions by using detailed information for over one thousand 
                                                 
2 In recognition, NYSE listing rules set out strict formal guidelines with respect to the number and identity of 
outside directors of U.S. firms. Equally, the Combined Code for U.K. firms highlights boards and especially outside 
directors as central to the good governance of firms; “When corporate strategies fail or governance lapses, attention 
rightly focuses on the contribution of the non-executive director.” (Higgs Report, 2003, p. 3). 
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outside directors of 264 U.K. non-financial firms, and by exploiting a British tradition of 
awarding titles (i.e. Lord, Baroness and Sir) to signal a person’s ability and social standing and 
prestige. Using biographical information on the director’s background, we supplement our 
database with further proxies of a privileged education and access to business (corporate) 
networks, charity and social organizations, membership of professional bodies and government 
experience. . 
 
Our study is divided into three sections. First, we investigate and find evidence of self-selection 
among director peer groups. Self-selection is the probability that, ceteris paribus, boards with 
titled directors are more likely to select new directors with similar titles to their own. We find 
significant self-selection among politically titled directors (e.g., Lords, and The Rt. Hon. former 
cabinet members).3  In line with this, directors with a Sir title are more likely to be appointed to 
larger boards, and boards that also include Sirs as outside directors. We observe a similar 
phenomenon for the self-selection of outside directors with the professor title. 
 
Second, using instrumental techniques to control for business experience and ability, we can 
isolate and test for the effect of an outside director’s prestige on firm value using announcement 
effects of new director appointments. We find that the prestige of a director – independent of his 
ability – has no significant effect on firm value. However, this is not the case for very large 
boards (over twelve directors), where prestige seems to carry value in itself, resulting in positive 
and significant announcement effects. We also find that previous outside directorship experience 
is associated with significant positive announcement effects. 
 
Third, we observe that prestige helps directors to obtain multiple directorships, while controlling 
for professional and academic qualifications, prior work experience and firm performance. We 
find that prestigious directors are less likely to retire from boards, after controlling for tenure and 
age, suggesting that the greater number of directorship may in partly be due to the lower turnover 
of these directors. The results suggest that the number of directorships, commonly used as a 
proxy for experience and director quality, may also represent non-ability related attributes like 
prestige and peer group networks that increase director’s ability to obtain outside directorships.  
                                                 
3 In this study, we assume that our economic relationships are driven by demand side factors. In fact, it is likely that 
they are an equilibrium outcome of a matching process between the firms choice to nominate (demand) and the 
directors’ choice to accept (supply). However, without information about instances of refused directorships (non-
supply) or refused nominations (non-demand), we are unable to distinguish between these two effects. We therefore 
follow the prior literature, and assume that directors always accept nominations, and therefore the supply of outside 
directors is perfectly elastic. 
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The importance of prestigious directors on British boards was identified as early as 1939 by 
Wilfred May, who argued that boards used peers to attract capital and wrote “… in particular for 
prospectus purposes, boards are dressed up for snobbery appeal”. He pointed out that almost a 
third of all British peers held at least one UK board seat, and questioned the contribution (if any) 
they made to a board. He went on to quote a senior official as: “I so frequently find they 
[directors] are expert in nothing at all. They have merely got a nice sounding name to put onto 
the prospectus. They can offer nothing but that name or that acquaintance they have who can be 
induced to put up the capital” (p. 484). Despite the apparent frequency of prestigious directors, 
and the popular suspicion of agency costs, no studies have addressed their effect on governance. 
This is the first study to document the selection of prestigious outside directors to boards and 
their effect on firm value.  
 
Prestige is in itself a multi-dimensional construct, which makes it difficult to quantify. In most 
general terms it can be defined as having status, which is composed out of a mixture of defined 
attributes like education, experience, social connections and skills. (D’Aveni, 1990, and D’Aveni 
and Fesner, 1993). Work in sociology suggests that an individual’s prestige is in addition a partly 
subjective concept that “resides in the minds of other individuals – specifically that individual’s 
subjectively associate prestige with another’s occupational characteristics” (Certo, 2003, p. 436). 
On the “individual level, prestige helps to maintain an illusion of competence and control by 
influencing interpersonal reactions to the individual. That is, prestige is taken as an indication 
that the manager is competent, credible and trustworthy” (D’Aveni, 1990, p. 121). In this paper, 
we focus on the ‘illusion of competence’, hence the component of prestige that is not 
underpinned by hard attributes like education but is associated with a good name alone.  
 
 
This paper is organized so that Chapter I below discusses the literature, Chapter II outlines the 
data and presents the summary statistics, and Chapter III analyses the self-selection of new 
directors amongst their peer groups. Chapter IV then analyses the impact on firm performance, 
while Chapter V discusses the determinants of multiple board appointments. Chapter VI 
concludes. 
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I. Boards, Non-executive Directors and Their Impact on Firms 
 
In general, boards comprise the executives who manage the firm, and non-executives who 
control and advise them. While the general structure is the same all over the world for publicly 
listed companies; their form and composition differs. Similarly, their fiduciary duty of protecting 
the interests of shareholders is uniform, but is supplemented in certain countries by their duty 
towards the interests of other stakeholders. The U.K. corporate governance system is in its 
structure very similar to the U.S. system with a unitary board and compulsory audit, nomination 
and remuneration committees. It differs from the U.S. system in respect to the separation of the 
role of the chairman and chief executive. In addition, English corporate law allocates 
substantially more power to shareholders, which effectively curtail the power of the board when 
compared to the US. The Combined Code (the U.K. Corporate Governance code) requires all 
members of the remuneration committee to be independent outside directors, and the majority of 
its nomination committee. All outside (non-executive) board members in the U.K. are elected on 
a three year basis, and should be re-elected for a maximum of three terms in total. 
 
The academic evidence linking U.S. board structure to firm performance is inconclusive. Neither 
board composition nor board leadership structure has been consistently linked to firm 
performance (see for example Bhagat and Black, 2000; Klein, 1998; Hermalin and Weisbach, 
2003). However, there has been more success linking board structure to particular events that 
ultimately help to improve the performance of the firm. Outside directors had been positively 
linked to performance-increasing restructuring programs (Perry and Shivdasani, 2005) and target 
shareholder gains in a hostile takeover (Cotter et al., 1997), CEO turnover in underperforming 
firms (Weisbach, 1988), while Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) find that negative firm 
performance will lead to a higher number of outside directors on a board. Overall, there is 
considerable evidence that shows that smaller boards might be more effective than larger ones 
(Yermack, 1996; Wu, 2000), validating an opinion expressed earlier by Lipton and Lorsch 
(1992)). 
 
Quantifying the quality of an outside director is a challenging task, as the director’s personal 
characteristics are largely unobservable. In the U.S. context, a well-established indicator for a 
director’s quality is the number of outside directorships held (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Kaplan 
and Reishus, 1990; Coles and Hoi, 2003; Farrell and Whidbee; 2000; Harford, 2003; Yermack, 
2004). It is argued that directors get elected onto additional boards if their companies show 
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superior performance, and this performance is in part attributable to them (e.g., Gilson, 1990). 
These directors are termed professional directors, and are more likely to be hired by larger, more 
profitable firms (Ferris, Jagannathan and Pritchard, 2003). Opponents of this view argue that 
directors eventually become too busy to mind their boards, decreasing with every appointment 
the marginal value they can add to each board (e.g., Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). It is therefore 
not clear if directors with multiple directorships always represent value for the hiring board. As 
multiple directorships are the observed ex-post outcome of a decision to hire a director, they are 
an indirect measure of director quality. This is because the appointment of a new director is 
likely to reflect the outcome of a bargaining game that takes into account the firm’s, as well as 
the director’s, characteristics. 
 
Another strand of the literature looks at the announcement effects of director appointments to 
develop attributes of non-executive directors that are well sought after by the market. Rosenstein 
and Wyatt (1990) find that - on average – there is a positive announcement effect following the 
announcement of a new appointment of outside director to U.S. boards. These results were 
subsequently qualified by Shivdasani and Yermack (1999), who confirmed on average 
announcement effects for appointments where the CEO was not involved, versus average 
negative announcement where the CEO was involved. Fich (2005) established that CEOs of 
other companies were comparatively more sought after by the market – as measured by their 
announcement effects – and that successful CEOs are particularly sought after by growth 
companies. However Lin et al. (2003) could not establish any general announcement effects for 
the U.K. for the period 1993-1996. The contrasting results may be due to differences in outside 
director quality that leads to some, but not all, appointments drawing positive stock price returns. 
 
Our study primarily builds on the existing literature on corporate governance and the efficiency 
of boards. Our primary contribution lies in extending and refining the selection criteria for 
outside directorships.  
 
II. Data and Summary Statistics 
 
We construct a unique dataset containing the board members of all non-financial firms that form 
part of the FTSE 350 in 2001 and 2004.4 Our sample contains the largest 264 listed non-financial 
                                                 
4 Unfortunately, accurate information on directorships for the years prior to 2001 is not available. 
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U.K. firms that were constituents of the FTSE 350 in these years.5 We obtain the firm’s 
accounting information from Compustat Global and match these with share price information 
obtained from DataStream Advance. The median book (market) value of companies is £675.8 
(£576.6) million and £828.62 (£664.8) in 2001 and 2004 respectively. The median market to 
book remains relatively stable at 1.4 in 2001 and 1.45 in 2004, as does the six month average 
daily stock price variance.  
 
Our approach is to study the cross-sectional determinants of discrete changes in directorships 
over this three year period. We use three years as the appointment cycle for outside directorships. 
As these appointments are staggered, a three year window ensures that each director in our 
sample stands for re-election at least once. This way, we ensure that we collect data on every 
appointment, re-election or departure for every director once in the cycle.  
 
Next, we obtain information about the firms’ board of directors, including board size and 
individual board director characteristics from BoardEx6 for both 2001 and 2004. The average 
board size of the firms in our sample declined from 9.39 in 2001 to 9.18 by 2004. In addition, the 
number of very large boards (of at least 14 directors or more) declined from 20 such boards to 14 
over the same period. In line with changes to the U.K. Combined Code in 20037, companies 
decreased instances of joint chairman/CEO roles from 7.2% to 4.2% and increased the ratio of 
outside directors on their boards.8 The characteristics of the companies in our sample are 
depicted in Table I below. 
 
<Insert Table I about here> 
 
We focus our analysis on outside directors only and therefore excluded all directors that held 
executive positions either in 2001 or 2004. We obtain detailed information on director 
characteristics including age and tenure on the board, as well as information about the director’s 
                                                 
5 We choose firms that survived over this three year period to control for variations in the composition of firms in 
our sample. Of the total number of non-financial firms in the FTSE 350, 47 exited through delisting, acquisition 
and/or bankruptcy between 2001 and 2004. 
6 BoardEx is a private data vendor that collects detailed information on board and director characteristics, including 
director identities and history of the board. For further information see www.boardex.com.  
7 The recommendations of the Higgs Report were incorporated into the Combined Code - the U.K. Corporate 
Governance Code - and came into effect on the 01. November 2003. 
8 There was only one firm (Wm Morrison Supermarkets PLC) that did not appoint any outside directors to the board 
in both 2001 and 2004. 
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titles and networks from BoardEx. We ensured that all titles of outside directors were obtained 
prior to 2001, and so are not related to board appointments.  
 
A. Outside Director Titles 
 
Directors in the U.K. may carry titles in their name including ‘Sir’, ‘Lord’, ‘The Rt. Honourable’ 
and ‘Professor’. Honours titles (Lord and Sir) go back as far as 1348 and are by now a distinctive 
feature of British society, where the Queen awards – at the recommendations of the Prime 
Minister and others – about 3000 titles and medals annually. They are awarded for outstanding 
achievements or exceptional service to the community, at all levels. They are therefore accolades 
and act as public signals of director’s reputation.  
 
We argue that titles are an indicator of the otherwise unobservable prestige and peer groups of an 
outside director. Our empirical identification does not require a casual relationship between 
prestige and titles, only a positive association. As there is also likely to be a positive association 
between titles and a director’s expertise, we will later seek to separate these two effects of ability 
and prestige. To our knowledge, no other country in the world integrates a person’s honorable 
award into their name; this provides a unique opportunity for us to use it as an indicator for both 
the directors’ ability as well as prestige – which to the best of our knowledge nobody else has 
done before. 
 
A.1.  Lord, Baroness and The Rt. Honorable 
 
The title of Lord (or ‘Baroness’ if the recipient is a woman) is to a large extent awarded for 
achievements in political positions and involvement in political projects. It carries with it the 
right to vote in the House of Lords, the upper house of the English legislative system.9 ‘Lord’ 
titles may be inherited, though there are a declining number of these on U.K. boards. For 
example in our sample, only three carry an inherited Lords 10title. The other politically related 
title is ‘Right Honourable’, which identifies a current or former member of the cabinet, while the 
                                                 
9 Although all Lords have the theoretical right to vote on every decision, only a few actually do so. The House of 
Lords is divided into peers with a clear political orientation and party background and who sit on the Labour, 
Conservative or Liberal Democrats bench respectively. They are appointed with the expectation to regularly appear 
in the House of Lords and to follow party lines. In addition, there are those peers that are appointed with no clear 
party link, who sit on the cross-bench and who normally only vote on issues where they have a particular interest or 
knowledge in. 
10 Out of a total of 92 hereditary peers which were allowed to remain in the House of Lords following the House of 
Lords Act from 1999. The House of Lords has 746 members in January 2007. 
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‘Honourable’ identifies a member of parliament. These directors may obtain outside 
directorships after they have resigned their government posts, but may still maintain informal 
links with government.  
 
A.2.  Sir, Madam and Professor 
 
In contrast, achievement in other parts of society like business and management, sport or any 
other non-political achievements are awarded a honorary ‘Sir’ title. Individuals with this title are 
likely to have made significant achievements in one of a variety of fields, often in business or 
science but also in areas like the arts or sport. Unlike the political titles defined above, many of 
the Sirs may not have worked in government positions11.  
 
The final group of titled directors is directors with the ‘Professor’ title. Though not directly 
related to business operations, these titles are either awarded for achievement in the academic 
sciences or indirect contributions to academic institutions that than merit an honorary degree. We 
observe instances of honorary degrees, but can not directly identify reasons for their award. 
However, we could establish that 43% of outside directors with a Professors title had their title 
awarded as an honorary academic degree (Table II).  
 
 
B. Outside Director Networks 
 
As we have outlined above, access to social groups and networks might have a considerable 
influence on the likelihood of being appointed to a board. To analyze this, we have constructed a 
social network variable that captures the breath of business and government contacts of a 
director. We measure a director’s business network as the number of individuals a director has 
worked with in board or senior management positions over their available work history12 through 
their positions in private companies both in the U.K. and internationally. BoardEx, our data 
supplier, sourced the information on the director’s work history through company websites, news 
announcements, and other publicly available information sources13. Formally: 
 
                                                 
11 Again, as an exception to the rule, lower ranked public servants, or those serving in less important ministries, will 
only receive a Sir and not a Lord title upon retirement from government.  
12 The work history of the director is often voluntarily disclosed, and may range back twenty or more years. 
13 In some instances this included the director’s CV. 
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Where Ni is the network of director ‘i’, Iijm is the indicator variable if director ‘i’ worked with 
director ‘j’ in company ‘m’.14 The director’s network is the number (breath) of connections that 
indicates the range of professional experience a director has had in his/her professional life.15 
The sum of networks are likely to be higher for more experienced, as well as more transparent 
directors, two characteristics sought after in the market for outside directors.16 
 
Table II depicts the key characteristics of titled directors on U.K. boards in 2001 and 2004. In 
both years of our sample, titled directors are – on average – older, hold higher degrees and are 
more likely to have graduated from Oxford or Cambridge, two of the most prestigious 
universities in the United Kingdom. There is little difference in professional qualifications, but 
titled directors do have significantly higher corporate networks, have worked at a greater number 
of companies and are morel likely to hold government experience when compared with non-
titled directors. Finally, titled directors sit on larger boards of larger companies, and with a 
greater share of outsider directors.  
 
In contrast to Agrawal and Knoeber (2001), we do not find that political titled directors are 
statistically more likely in any one industry grouping, though they do feature more prominently 
in the services and manufacturing industries (Appendix Table I). However, Sir and Professor 
titles appear to be more prominent in the manufacturing sectors and in the chemical and 
pharmaceutical sectors. Our analysis suggests some, but not a great deal of, grouping by industry 
sector of titled outside directors. 
                                                 
14 Multiple network connections to a single individual, through companies and/or other work experience are counted 
as a single connection. 
15 In this sense, our variable is ‘blind’ to any single relationship between two directors. 
16 It is also likely to under-estimate networks of directors from the fields of consulting or the legal profession where 
the identity of the clients may be less transparent. This is a natural limitation of any network-related variable that 
seeks to identify less advertised professional relationships between directors. 
 11
 
III. Self-selection in the appointment of outside directors 
 
When sitting on boards, it is likely that directors derive some value from working with peers of 
the same background and characteristics. In addition, board functionality may increase with 
similarity of the directors’ mindset, potentially at the cost of diversity and innovation.17 
 
Zajac and Westphal (1996) observed that boards hiring a new CEO that is coming from outside 
the firm have a tendency to choose candidates that are demographically similar to themselves. In 
addition, Nguyen-Dang (2005) documents for the French corporate elite that once the CEO and 
the board members are from the same social circle, underperforming CEOs are less likely to lose 
their job. If these CEOs are nevertheless ousted from their position, they are then more likely to 
find a good position afterwards, supportive of the significance of peer group networks among 
CEOs and outside directors.  
 
U.K. corporate governance standards require a formal, rigorous and transparent procedure by the 
board for the nomination of new outside directors. The nomination committee, usually chaired 
by the Chairman or an independent outside director, decides on the nominees that are usually 
subsequently elected by the shareholders. It is therefore likely that the identities of the chairman 
and other non-executives determine the new director’s characteristics if self-selection is 
significant. Alternately, the CEO’s characteristics may also impact the choice of new outside 
directors if she has significant influence over the board.  
 
To separate the effect of prestige and ability in the director’s title, we apply non-linear 
instrumentation to the ex ante presence of titles on a board, prior to the appointment of a new 
director. The choice of instruments is challenging and non-trivial as they should be correlated 
with the unobservable prestige of directors, but not with their ability to govern a firm. Our choice 
of instruments is motivated by indicators of prestige and upper class in the U.K. First, we argue 
that an education from Oxford, Cambridge or Eton College indicate the director’s likely ex ante 
(or ex-post) access to peer groups arising from these institutions. Tuition at these prestigious 
institutions may compliment or establish an individual’s access to prestigious peer groups. 
Second, we use the director’s networks derived from non-commercial positions (in charities and 
                                                 
17 As information from heterogeneous information sources are systematically eliminated from the board. 
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government institutions) as possible indicators of the director’s access to prestigious peer groups. 
Finally, directors born and raised in the U.K. and with an English heritage are more likely to 
have access to prestigious social groups within the U.K. than foreign directors. We include an 
indicator variable that is unity if the director’s nationality is English.  
 
The new appointment of a prestigious director may be due to some unobservable characteristics 
of the firm, rather than the directors that sit on it’s board. Equivalently, the probability of a titled 
peer appointment may be conditionally observed based on the board’s characteristics. To 
separate these two effects, we employ a first stage Heckman’s selection model to address the 
systematic components of the selection of new titled directors to boards (Heckman, 1979). The 
first stage estimates the probability of having any titled directors on the board of directors prior 
to appointment. The instrumental (independent) variables are the proportion of English directors, 
those with studies from elite universities of Oxford, Cambridge and/or Eton College education. 
In addition, we add the board’s mean government and non-private sector (charity and other NFP 
organizations) networks, calculated in the same manner as our primary private sector networks 
variable. The corrected error terms from the first stage regression are used to estimate the second 
stage in the form:  
 
 
 
 
 
NewDirector_Title2004 is the title of the newly appointed director that joined the firm between 
2001 and 2004. OutsideDirector_Title2001 is a dichotomous variable that is unity if any of the 
outside directors on the board - prior to appointment - shared the same title as the appointed 
director. Chair_title2001 is unity if the chairman shared a title with the appointed director, while 
CEO_title2001 is unity if the CEO has any title at all18. The ExitingDirector_Title2001 is an 
indicator variable that is unity if any of the exiting director(s) has a title. 
 
The empirical model is similar to Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) who examine the probability 
of appointment of an outside director in U.S. firms. The empirical estimation also requires us to 
identify those independent outside directors that were not promoted within the firm. We 
manually identify each director’s election date and circumstances to ensure that the director was 
                                                 
18 The occurrence of CEO titles is very rare in our sample,  
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not promoted internally from an executive position that would compromise the otherwise 
objective selection criteria. We exclude all directors for whom we do not have an election date. 
We report in Table III below the probability of electing a titled director. 
 
<Insert Table III about here> 
 
We observe that the probability of electing a political titled director (Lord/The Rt. Hon) to a 
board is greater if the chairman of the board has also a political title; this effect is unrelated to 
other firm or board level effects. We do not find a similar effect for Chairmen that hold a Sir or 
Academic title, but we find that in these cases the peer-group specific self-selection works 
between the outside directors and the newly appointed directors. Consistent with U.K. corporate 
governance practices, we find that the CEO’s peer group has no impact on the characteristics of 
the newly elected directors. In summary, our results show that Chairmen and outside directors 
exert significant influence on the nomination committees and seem to be favoring (implicitly or 
explicitly) their own peer group in the selection of new directors. 
 
In addition to peer groups, we also examine the determinants of the newly elected director’s 
networks, the results of which are shown in Table IV. As business networks of the board are 
likely to be correlated with both the board’s ability and prestige, we instrument the board’s 
networks using the instruments outlined in the previous analysis in a first stage regression. The 
instrumented variables represent the prestige element associated with greater networks. The 
second stage regression estimates: 
 
  
 
 
 
We find that high corporate network directors are elected onto boards with greater business 
networks, supporting our previous findings of self-selection of directors with similar 
characteristics. The second regression shows that while both outside director’s and the 
chairman’s business networks are positive, it is the chairman’s business network that is most 
successful in drawing high network directors to the board of directors. Our empirical results are 
consistent with the important role of the Chairman in the election of new outside directors on 
U.K. boards.  
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<Insert Table IV About here> 
 
IV. Outside Director Prestige and Firm Value  
 
The relationship between board structure and firm value is a long contested subject in finance 
due to difficulties in establishing causality between firm value and corporate governance. This is 
because the mechanism and timing through which corporate governance influences shareholder 
value is not readily observable. As an example, good boards may implement corporate strategic 
initiatives that enhance shareholder value over different time-horizons, sometimes years after the 
board has been replaced. Therefore, the marginal effect of a change in governance is often 
related to a change in the market value of the firm, and can be measured through the 
announcement effect of an outside director appointment.  
 
 
There is a well established literature (e.g. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990, 1997); Lee, Rosenstein 
and Wyatt (1999); Shivdasani and Yermack (1999); Fich and Shivdasani (2006); DeFond et al. 
(2005)) that examines and find statistically significant stock price reactions to the announcement 
of new outside directors to a board. We follow this methodology by examining the determinants 
of the announcement returns of appointments of new independent outside directors to our sample 
firms’ boards. 
 
We find 578 announcements of outside director appointments between 2001 and 2004 on 
Bloomberg news. Of these, 238 (79) coincided with AGM (interim) results announcements, 48 
with major acquisition/sale of assets, seven with analyst recommendation changes and 19 with 
other major (unrelated) company announcements.19 We focus our attention on the appointment 
of independent outside directors and find 157 announcements that meet these criteria. A total of 
28 titled directors were appointed between 2001 and 2004, eight political titled directors (six 
Lords and two Rt. Honorable), seven Sirs/Madam and only three professors. The small sample 
size reflects the precise (albeit conservative) approach used to construct a clean sample of 
announcement effects. We calculate the abnormal announcement effect using Dodd and Warner 
                                                 
19 We also exclude multiple observations where firms made multiple director appointments, including senior 
executive positions. 
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(1983) two days around the announcement date (t-1 to t+1).20 The distribution of returns is close to 
the normal distribution, centered at 0.001% and reported in Figure 1. The mean (median) return 
is 0.166% (0.108%), and is similarly small in magnitude, though different in sign, to those 
reported by Shivdasani and Yermack (1999). We model the determinants of the abnormal returns 
as being a function of the director’s peer groups (titles) and of controls for exiting (titled) 
directors, the director’s age, prior board experience and highest university degree. We also 
control for the firm’s ROA, firm size, board size, percent of outside directors on the board and 
the CEO’s age.  
 
As outlined previously, titles reflect a combination of prestige and ability. The correlation 
between director titles and the unobserved ability is likely to bias our coefficient estimates and 
requires instrumentation.  We estimate a first-stage probit regression using the director’s title as 
the dependent variable and our instrumental variables, as described above, as the independent 
variable. The second stage employs the predicted probabilities21 to estimate their effect on the 
abnormal announcement. Correctly chosen instruments will ensure that our estimates show the 
marginal effect of the reputation of a peer group (rather than ability) on the announcement effect 
of new outside directors.  
 
The results for the second stage estimation are reported in Tables V and VI. Table V shows the 
result for the impact of the peer groups of an appointed outside director. The coefficient is 
positive but is only significant at the 10% significance level. The positive coefficient appears to 
indicate that there is some value (albeit very small in economic terms) associated with the 
prestige of peer groups joining a board. We further interact our indicator for peer groups with the 
board size indicator to test if this effect varies across different governance organizations. We 
separate boards into three size categories (i) from four to seven members, (ii) eight to twelve 
members and (iii) more than twelve directors. The cutoffs for the board size are chosen 
consistent with the bottom 25%, middle 50% and top 25% percentile groups of firms in our 
sample. The results, reported in the second regression of Table V, shows that the prestige of 
titled directors in itself seems to be of no value except for large boards. For these large boards, 
one standard deviation shift in the instrumented probability variable results in a 0.9% positive 
change in the abnormal return on announcement .   
 
                                                 
20 Using the natural logarithm of including only one day returns does not qualitatively alter our results.  
21 Using the continuous predicted values from the first-stage does not significantly alter our results. 
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As further evidence of our results, we adjusted the dependent variable ‘CAR’ with the inverse 
estimated probability ( ) 1)Pr(1 −− x  of an outside director appointment (Shivdasani and Yermack, 
1999).22 The adjusted CAR represents the estimated stock price reaction to the director 
appointment if the appointment had been unanticipated. The results are consistent with our 
baseline model and increase the economic significance of the appointment of a prestigious 
outside director, independent of the director’s ability, to 1.67% positive change per one unit 
change in standard deviation.  
 
<Insert Table V about Here> 
 
Table VI reports the regression results by dissecting titles into political, ‘Sir/Madam’ and 
Professor and interacting the instrumented values of each of these with the board size as before. 
We observe a positive and significant announcement effect for outside directors with a political 
and ‘Sir/Madam’ title joining large boards, while equally we find a negative announcement 
effect for directors with academic titles joining small boards. The positive announcement effect 
of the directors with political and Sir/Madam titles joining large boards may be due to the value 
of political clout and/or connections brought to large organizations (Agrawal and Knoeber, 
2001).  
 
An alternate explanation may be that prestige acts as a certification signal from the newly 
appointed director to the market about the quality of the firm. Consider the case where a 
prestigious director with reputation concerns is approached to sit on a board. If the appointee 
firm is large (with a large board) this is likely to result in significant public exposure for the 
director. The exposure of the firm is therefore directly related to the negative publicity the 
director may receive if the firm fails. Assuming that the appointee director conducts some due 
diligence before taking the position, she is likely to accept the position conditional on a favorable 
signal about the economic health of the firm. The greater the prestige and therefore reputation 
concerns of the director, the more likely that the director’s signal will be a significant 
determinant of the decision to accept the position. On the announcement date, the market may 
perceive the director’s decision to accept the nomination as an indicator of the director’s 
favorable private signal. In addition, the reputation concerns of a prestigious director may signal 
a greater motivation to monitor management.  
                                                 
22 We estimate the probability of an outside director appointment using a broader sample of both outside and 
executive director appointments and explanatory variables of the board’s characteristics including CEO age, exiting 
director characteristics, firm and board size and ROA following Shivdasani and Yermack (1999).  
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A third explanation is that our instruments for prestige are also capturing some form of business 
ability, and that we do not control for some of these in our regression. For example, if attendance 
at prestigious organizations like Oxford and Cambridge is correlated with a director’s business 
skills on a board, then our instrumented proxy may also be capturing ability effects. Due to data 
limitations, we are unable to pursue a finer investigation of a director’s background or family 
history that may provide a clearer indicator prestige. 
 
<Insert Table VI About here> 
 
We find that prior board experience as an outside director (by holding two or more such 
positions prior to the announcement of an additional board seat) is valued by the market, 
increasing the appointee firm’s market value by an economically significant 2.2%.23 Our positive 
economic effect arises from a small number of directors with two or three prior directorships, as 
our sample does not contain any directors with the large number of directorships that would 
classify them as a ‘busy’ director. We are therefore unable to test the hypothesis that ‘busy’ 
directors with many directorships are associated with weak corporates and lower firm value 
(Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). 
 
V. Multiple Directorships, Director Reputation and Networks 
 
The choice of new board members may represent a combination of other, non-ability based, 
factors, as we have shown in Section III, This suggests that the number of directorships is a noisy 
indicator of director quality, which we aim to improve and qualify with this paper. The next part 
of our analysis provides a direct measure of the effect of non-board experience and prestige on 
the probability of obtaining outside directorships.  
 
On casual observation, instances of directors with multiple directorships are relatively similar on 
both sides of the Atlantic. A majority of 87% and 82% of directors in 2001 and 2004 
respectively hold only one outside position in the U.K., while Ferris, Jagannathan and Pritchard 
(2003) report a corresponding figure of 81.5% for the U.S.. Looking at the U.K., professional 
directors are more likely to have titles and command greater business networks than other 
                                                 
23 We are unable to test if directors become ‘too busy’ due to sample limitations as there is only one director that 
held more than three directorships in our announcement return sample. 
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directors. Interestingly, they are also more likely to hold degrees from prestigious institutions 
like Cambridge and Oxford, most significantly in 2001, but are equally likely to hold business 
degrees. Multiple board directors are more likely to be affiliated with professional bodies (like 
accounting or bankers associations), especially in 2004. The dissemination of recent changes in 
corporate governance standards (Higgs Report, 2003) is likely to have contributed to an 
increased shift toward accounting and other qualifications being present on the board.  Neither 
government experience nor firm size is significantly different across single and multiple board 
directors.  
 
<Insert Table VII about here> 
 
To relate multiple directorships to our indicators for director quality, we regress the number of 
board positions held as at 2004 against (i) prestige component of a director’s titles, (ii) a 
director’s business networks, (iii) measures of director ability like the highest degree or 
affiliations to professional bodies, (iv) director’s tenure24 and age and (v) controls for the firm’s 
characteristics motivated by Saunders and Shivdasani (1999). Due to the problems of 
endogeneity, the dependent variable of multiple directorships is measured at 2004 while the 
other directors’ and firms’ characteristics are measured at 2001.25 The regression is estimated 
using an ordered probit with robust errors, with the results reported in Table VIII below. 
 
< Insert Table VIII about here> 
 
The prestige of holding a title increases the likelihood of holding multiple directorships, as do 
higher business networks. This result is consistent with our previous findings of self-selection 
among prestigious directors. Our findings compliment the existing literature on the value of 
business experience in the market for outside directors. The second regression estimates the 
probability of retirement; the probability that the director holds no board seats in 2004 given that 
they held at least one in 2001. The results in Table VIII show that prestigious directors are less 
likely to retire from boards even after controlling for their age, tenure and experience. 
Calculating the marginal effect, titled directors are 13% less likely to retire than their non-titled 
                                                 
24 We use an indicator variable for outside directors with over six years of service on the same board. The Higgs 
Report (2003) suggests that “A non-executive director should normally be expected to serve two three-year terms..”.  
25 For professional directors, we take the average of the firm characteristics and tenure on the board, and set the 
committee membership as unity if the director is a member of any of these committees. 
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peers. This does not vary with the director’s age and suggests some scope for agency costs 
related to prestigious outside directors  
 
Our results also show that directors with higher degrees (qualifications) are more likely to hold 
multiple directorships suggesting that boards value academic and business training. Interestingly, 
government experience does not in itself lead to additional directorships. This supports the 
argument that a finer measure of networks, for example titles and particular social networks, are 
a more accurate measure of the role of prestige in these markets.  In addition, directors above the 
retirement age of 65 are 38%, while director’s with more than six years on the same board are 
29% more likely to retire. 
 
As a second test, we construct a matched sample of titled and non-titled directors shown in Table 
IX. The matching criteria are the director’s age, business networks, firm size and formal 
education (the number of degrees).26 The control group of directors matches in each of these 
criteria closely, as shown by the insignificant test-of-means scores between the two samples. 
Consistent with our earlier results, the titled directors hold more directorships in both 2001 and 
2004, as well as, more chairmanships in 2001. These differences are statistically significant at 
the 99% confidence interval. Finally, titled directors are more likely to stay on boards, but have 
similar qualifications and sit on similar sized boards as their matched counter-parts. Titled 
directors are more likely to hold government experience, consistent with the search criteria 
associated with the selection of politically titled directors. In economic terms, titled directors 
hold on average 0.284 more directorships equivalent to an expected £12,567 a year in outside 
director salaries.27 Using our average sampled tenure of 5.5 years and a discount rate of 5%, the 
direct value of a title in terms of an outside director’s salary is £59,155.  
 
< Insert Table IX about here> 
                                                 
26 The control sample is chosen from the other (non-titled) outside directors. For each pair of directors, we calculate 
the difference between each matching criteria (i.e. age) and standardise the difference by the standard deviation of 
the variable. We then take the sum of the standardised differences for all four of the matching criteria for each titled 
director. The (non-titled) director with the minimum value represents the closest match for our titled sample.  
27 The average salary of £44,250 for a U.K. outside (non-executive) director is obtained from KPMG 2004 Survey 
of FTSE 100 Directors’ Compensation. 
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VI. Discussion 
 
This paper examines the economic impact of prestige and director networks on the choice of 
outside director and firm value. We have four primary results. First, we find evidence that 
outside directors on boards self-select other directors with a similar background (titles) and 
networks. Our empirical tests control for the endogeneity of the board composition prior to 
appointment, and find that both outside directors and the chairman have a significant bias 
towards their own peer group.  
 
Second, when isolating the prestige component of titles (as compared to ability), we find that the 
election of titled directors (in particular Lords and Sirs) do not significantly impact firm value, 
except for the largest boards. This indicates that the selection process of outside directors is in 
general sufficient as it focuses on the ability of outside directors. It also shows that prestige can 
be of value on large boards. We present a number of hypotheses to explain how prestige may act 
as a positive signal of firm value. 
 
Third, we find that investors value experienced outside directors, reflected by a positive and 
significant announcement effect. However, we are unable to test the ‘busy’ hypothesis of too 
many directorships as put forward by Fich and Shivdasani (2006). As we control for the ability 
and prestige of directors, our results suggest that the number of directorships may reflect other, 
non-ability based attributes that are valued by the market.   
 
Fourth, we find that the number of directorships is positively related to an outside director’s 
prestige, as well as their ability measured by the number of formal qualifications and education. 
In addition, we also find that prestigious directors are less likely to retire from boards, after 
controlling for tenure and age as well as qualifications and experience. Our results are consistent 
with self-selection among directors of similar (social) backgrounds and suggest that the number 
of directorships is likely to represent a combination of director characteristics, including 
director’s prestige. Consistent with good corporate governance practices, professional 
qualification and higher university education are both valued in the market for outside 
directorships.   
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Our results show that social networks and prestige matter in the market for outside directors. It is 
not clear if this arises due to agency problems or through an efficient signaling mechanism of 
unobservable director quality. Contrary to popular suspicion, we do not find evidence of agency 
costs for firms that elect prestigious outside directors, while at the same time only the largest 
boards appear to benefit positively from the prestige of outside directors. One possible 
explanation for this is that prestige and social networks provide the glue that ensure that boards 
“maintain a shared sense of collegiality and a common understanding of all the issues facing the 
company”, which Martin Lipton claims is essential for the well functioning of a board (Lipton, 
2006b, p. 2). 
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Table I: Firm Summary Statistics 
The sample consists of 264 U.K. listed firms that formed part of the 
FTSE 350 in 2001 and 2004. The accounting and market statistics are 
at the annual report date while the stock variance is measured over the 
six months prior to the reporting date. Statistics marked '*' are reported 
medians. 
  2001 2004 
Board Size 9.39 9.18 
 (2.9) (2.6) 
Proportion of Outside Directors 0.54 0.58 
 (0.14) (0.12) 
CEO/Chairman Firms 7.2% 4.2% 
 (0.26) (0.20) 
Profitability (Earnings / Assets) 0.06 0.07 
 (0.10) (0.11) 
Book Value of Assets* 675.77 828.62 
   
Market Value of Equity* 576.55 664.835 
   
Market-to-Book* 1.40 1.45 
   
Daily Stock Return Variance 1.884 2.291 
  (0.888) (0.994) 
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Table II. Titles and characteristics of Non-Executive Directors on UK boards 
The sample consists of outside directors on the boards of 264 U.K.’s largest non-financial firms that form part of the FTSE 350 index. Titled 
directors are classified as those with a ‘Sir/Madam’ title, those with political titles of ‘Lord/Baroness’ and ‘The Rt. Hon.’, and those with the 
‘Professor’ title. Directors may hold multiple titles. The board size, percent of outside directors, tenure and firm size are recorded as at the 
firm’s annual reporting date 2001 and 2004. The significance tests are Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test for discrete variables and test 
of proportions for dichotomous variables. The ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.  
  
Non-Titled 
Directors 
Titled 
Directors 
Political 
Title 
Sir/Madam 
Title 
Professor 
Title 
Title vs. Non-
Titled Director 
Panel A - Director Education and Experience 1363 263 98 164 30   
Director age 58.015 63.414 60.704 64.939 61.300 *** 
 (7.660) (6.436) (7.681) (5.376) (7.231)  
Highest degree (1 = B.A., 2 = M.A., 3 = Ph.D.) 0.938 1.506 1.388 1.482 2.367 *** 
 (0.847) (1.044) (0.938) (1.077) (0.809)  
Oxford / Cambridge degree (%) 0.166 0.300 0.388 0.305 0.167 *** 
 (0.372) (0.459) (0.490) (0.462) (0.379)  
Business school (%) 0.100 0.080 0.082 0.079 0.000  
 (0.300) (0.272) (0.275) (0.271) (0.000)  
Professional qualifications (%) 0.314 0.342 0.194 0.421 0.400  
 (0.467) (0.475) (0.397) (0.495) (0.498)  
Honorary degree (%) 0.000 0.049 0.000 0.012 0.433 *** 
 (0.000) (0.217) (0.000) (0.110) (0.504)  
Corporate networks 80.712 103.255 113.391 99.082 85.750 *** 
 (104.318) (100.055) (121.981) (80.608) (107.748)  
Number of companies worked at before 2001 6.915 9.049 8.439 9.232 7.933 *** 
 (5.473) (5.422) (5.593) (5.408) (6.057)  
Government experience (%) 0.095 0.433 0.592 0.378 0.167 *** 
 (0.294) (0.496) (0.494) (0.486) (0.379)  
Panel B - Board Characteristics             
Board size 9.984 10.953 11.168 10.678 10.883 *** 
 (2.947) (3.154) (3.722) (2.643) (2.999)  
Percent of outside directors on board 0.595 0.601 0.590 0.605 0.612 ** 
 (0.135) (0.132) (0.131) (0.127) (0.147)  
Tenure on board 6.372 6.861 7.356 6.523 6.464  
 (5.788) (6.354) (8.138) (5.138) (4.872)  
Log(Company Size) 7.108 7.588 7.726 7.599 6.751 *** 
  (1.774) (1.894) (1.896) (1.798) (2.172)   
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Table III. Self-selection among titled peer groups of directors. 
The table reports the results of the logit regression for the characteristics of appointment new directors on UK boards between 2001 and 2004. The 
sample consists of 464 non-executive director appointments for a sample of FTSE 350 industrial firms. The dependent variable is the title of the new 
non-executive director appointed while the board and firm characteristics are measured as at 2001. The titled director is a dichotomous variable that is 
unity if the director has any titles and zero otherwise. The political title indicator variables Lord, The Rt Hon, take the value of unity if the director has 
that title, while academic takes the value of the director is either a Doctor or a Professor. Firm size is the total book value of assets in 2001 while the 
cumulative abnormal return is the twelve month return prior to 2001 adjusted by the market. Statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels are 
indicated by *, ** and *** respectively. 
Variables Appointed director has any title 
Appointed director has 
Political title 
Appointed director has 
Sir/Madam title 
Appointed director 
has Professor title 
At least one board outside director(s) has 
the same title as appointed director(1/0) 1.721*** -0.06 1.953*** 1.895* 
 (0.498) (1.901) (0.751) (0.997) 
Chairman has the same title as appointed 
director (1/0) -0.024 1.037** 0.439 0.506 
 (0.177) (0.413) (0.291) (0.565) 
The CEO has a title (1/0) -0.098 0.085 -0.398 -0.513 
 (0.214) (0.316) (0.346) (0.616) 
Exiting director(s) has the same title as 
appointed director (1/0) -0.412** -1.222* -0.221 -0.068 
 (0.195) (0.638) (0.313) (-0.009) 
Log(Firm Size) -0.110* 0.089 -0.04 0.158 
 (0.067) (0.104) (0.104) (0.166) 
Board Size 0.077* 0.033 0.120** -0.009 
 (0.040) (0.059) (0.06) (0.095) 
Percent of Outside Directors 1.652** 1.049 1.124 -1.334 
 (0.679) (1.074) (0.967) (1.703) 
CAR2001 0.153 -0.178 -0.015 -0.146 
 (0.198) (0.410) (0.34) (0.538) 
Wald-Chi2 1.5 8.22 1.63 5.33 
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Table IV. The choice of business networks of new directors. 
The table reports the instrumental multinomial regression results for the business networks 
of newly appointed directors. The chairman and other outside directors’ business networks 
are instrumented in the first stage. The second stage results are reported below. The 
dependent variable is the log of the newly appointed director’s business network. Firm size 
is the total book value of assets in 2001 while the cumulative abnormal return is the twelve 
month return before 2001 adjusted by the market. Statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 
percent levels are indicated by *, ** and *** respectively. 
Independent Variables Business Networks of Appointed Director 
Board's Mean Business Network 0.013**  
 xxx  
Chairman's Business Network  0.008** 
  (0.004) 
Outside Directors Mean  Business Network  0.005 
  (0.005) 
CEO Business Network (x103)  0.336 
  (1.278) 
Exiting Director’s Network (x103) -0.001 -0.860 
 (0.002) (2.602) 
Log(Firm Size) 0.029 -0.03 
 (0.065) (0.082) 
Board Size -0.018 -0.026 
 (0.03) (0.033) 
Percent of Outside Directors -0.411 -0.508 
 (0.552) (0.564) 
CAR2001 0.054 0.131 
 (0.145) (0.178) 
F-Statistic 7.87 3.83 
Adjusted R2 0.1148      .xxx 
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Figure 1. Abnormal Returns of Outside Director Appointments (2001 - 2004)
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The figure reports the distribution of the sample 157 cumulative abnormal return 
announcements around the time of outside director appointments to U.K. boards 
of directors. The raw returns are adjusted using the method outlined by Dodd and 
Warner (1983), and taken around the time of the announcement date (t-1 to t+1). 
The scale is 0.1% for each bar of the histogram.  
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Table V - Announcement Effects of prestigious outside directors 
The table reports the results of the multinomial regression of 157 announcement effects of new independent non-executive director 
announcements between 2001 and 2004 with robust errors. The cumulative abnormal announcement returns (CAR) are calculated as 
Dodd and Warner (1983) from one day prior to one day post the announcement date. The adjusted announcement returns are 
calculated as Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) by adjusting the market model CAR by the estimated probability of an outside director 
appointment. Directors with titled peers are instrumented and the predicted probabilities used to interact with board size. The Titled 
director replaced is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of unity if a titled director left board. The experienced director takes 
the value of unity if the director held two or more directorships prior to the appointment while the age indicator variable takes the 
value of unity if the director is over 65 years of age.  The ROA is the return on assets in 2001 standardised by the two-digit SIC 
industry median in the same year while the percentage of outside directors is measured prior to appointment. The highest degree is a 
discrete variable for the highest degree of the new director (B.A., M.A., or Ph.D.). Statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent 
levels are indicated by *, ** and *** respectively. 
Independent Variables CARt-1 to t+1 CARt-1 to t+1 
Adjusted  
CARt-1 to t+1 
Adjusted  
CARt-1 to t+1 
Prestige of a Titled Director  0.036*  0.065  
 (0.021)  (0.045)  
* Large Board ( > 12)  0.071***  0.131*** 
  (0.022)  (0.047) 
* Med Board (8 - 12)  0.027  0.048 
  (0.029)  (0.061) 
* Small Board (< 8)  -0.016  -0.036 
  (0.028)  (0.065) 
Titled Director Replaced (1/0) 0.006 0.005 0.015 0.014 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.013) 
Experienced Director (1/0) 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.042*** 0.041*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.015) (0.015) 
Director over 65 (1/0) -0.01 -0.011 -0.018 -0.021 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.038) (0.038) 
ROA -0.017 -0.013 -0.03 -0.022 
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 (0.0130 (0.012) (0.027) (0.026) 
Log (Total Assets) -0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) 
Log(Board Size) -0.043 -0.008 -0.052* -0.002 
 (0.033) (0.032) (0.031) (0.017) 
Percent of Outside Directors -0.019 -0.012 -0.006 0.004 
 (0.063) (0.063) (0.066) (0.03) 
CEO Age (x103) 0.400 0.334 0.569 0.444 
 (0.446) (0.452) (0.914) (0.930) 
Highest Degree -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.1043 0.1113 0.1435 0.0811 
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Table VI - Announcement Date Effects and Director Titles 
The table reports the results of the multinomial regression of 157 announcement effects of new independent non-executive director 
announcements between 2001 and 2004 with robust errors. The abnormal announcement returns are calculated as Dodd and Warner 
(1983). Directors with political, Sir/Madam and academic peers are instrumented and the predicted probabilities used to interact with 
board size. The Titled director replaced is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of unity if a titled director left board. The 
experienced director takes the value of unity if the director held two or more directorships prior to the appointment while the age indicator 
variable takes the value of unity if the director is over 65 years of age.  The ROA is the return on assets in 2001 standardised by the two-
digit SIC industry median in the same year while the percentage of outside directors is measured prior to appointment. The highest degree 
is a discrete variable for the highest degree of the new director (B.A., M.A., or Ph.D.) Statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent 
levels are indicated by *, ** and *** respectively. 
Independent Variables CARt-1 to t+1 CARt-1 to t+1 CARt-1 to t+1 CARt-1 to t+1 
Prestige of a Political Director 0.042  0.026 0.051 
 (0.048)  (0.044) (0.045) 
* Large Board (>12)  0.110**   
  (0.05)   
* Med Board (8-12)  0.011   
  (0.059)   
* Small Board (< 8)  -0.084   
  (0.065)   
Prestige of a Director with ‘Sir’  0.058   0.064 
 (0.038)   (0.04) 
* Large Board (>12)   0.114**  
   (0.046)  
* Med Board (8-12)   0.047  
   (0.044)  
* Small Board (< 8)   0.03  
   (0.051)  
Prestige of an Academic Director  -0.25 -0.186 -0.273*  
 (0.169) (0.154) (0.161)  
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* Large Board (>12)    -0.138 
    (0.272) 
* Med Board (8-12)    -0.212 
    (0.191) 
* Small Board (< 8)    -0.824*** 
    (0.308) 
Titled Director Replaced (1/0) 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.007 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Experienced Director (1/0) 0.017** 0.017** 0.018** 0.016* 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
Director over 65 (1/0) -0.031 -0.032 -0.036 -0.033 
 (0.032) (0.031) (0.036) (0.031) 
ROA -0.014 -0.009 -0.011 -0.016 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) 
Log (Total Assets) (x103) 0.074 0.812 -0.938 1.201 
 (2.957) (6.534) (6.687) (4.014) 
Log (Board Size) (x103) -0.023 -0.052* -0.008 -0.002 
 (0.015) (0.031) (0.032) (0.017) 
Percent of Outside Directors 0.007 -0.006 -0.012 0.004 
 (0.029) (0.066) (0.063) (0.03) 
CEO Age (x103) 0.424 0.357 0.409 0.428 
 (0.449) (0.455) (0.448) (0.458) 
Highest Degree (x103) -0.921 -0.882 -0.744 -0.796 
 (2.442) (2.527) (2.436) (2.443) 
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.1326 0.1113 0.1435 0.0811 
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Table VII. Outside Director Characteristics in 2001 and 2004.  
The sample consists of non-executive directors on the boards of 264 non-financial U.K. firms in 2001 and 2004. Directors with titles include all the 
titles of ‘Lord/Baroness’, ‘The Rt. Hon.’, 'Sir/Madam', or 'Professor'. Business networks is the sum of the directors networks gained from private 
business enterprise. The ‘Years on the board’ is the tenure of the director, averaged across all boards. Oxford/Cambridge graduate is the proportion 
with (under)graduate degrees from these institutions while ‘Business School’ is the proportion of directors that have attended a Business School. 
Professional Qualifications include membership to professional bodies like Chartered Accountants while government experience in the proportion 
of directors that have worked for government agencies. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. '***', '**', and '*' refer to significance at the 
99%, 95% and 90% confidence intervals respectively. The difference in means test for dichotomous variables is the difference in proportions, for 
discrete interval data it is the Mann-Whitney Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test, while for continuous variables it is the two-tail t-test.  
  2001  2004 
  
Single Board 
Directors 
Multiple Board 
Directors 
Difference 
in Mean / 
Proportion  
 Single Board Directors 
Multiple 
Board 
Directors 
Difference 
in Mean / 
Proportion 
Director Characteristics 868 160    878 191   
Directors with a title 0.203 0.394 ***  0.203 0.293 *** 
 (0.402) (0.490)   (0.402) (0.456)  
Business Networks 73.695 102.875 ***  87.623 125.324 *** 
 (101.407) (85.821)   (106.522) (102.520)  
Director’s Age 58.230 59.050   58.189 59.508 * 
 (8.287) (6.507)   (7.545) (5.590)  
Average Years on the Board 5.723 4.891   5.716 4.970  
 (5.959) (4.914)   (5.699) (3.841)  
Oxford / Cambridge Graduate 0.162 0.294 ***  0.166 0.204  
 (0.369) (0.457)   (0.373) (0.404)  
Business School Degree 0.101 0.094   0.122 0.079 * 
 (0.302) (0.292)   (0.327) (0.270)  
(Any) Professional Qualifications 0.274 0.388   0.285 0.445 *** 
 (0.449) (0.489)   (0.452) (0.509)  
Government Experience 0.149 0.200 *  0.139 0.173  
 (0.356) (0.401)   (0.346) (0.379)  
Firm Characteristics        
Board Size 10.449 10.222    9.904 10.046   
 (3.389) (2.332)   (2.712) (2.156)  
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Percent of outside directors on board 0.584 0.577   0.621 0.606  
 (0.149) (0.103)   (0.128) (0.084)  
Log (Company Size) 7.134 7.512   7.142 7.807  
  (1.857) (1.488)    (1.876) (1.432)   
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Table VIII. Directorships, Retirement and Director Prestige.  
The table reports the ordered probit regression results for the number of directorships held by a director 
in 2004 and the probit regression for the probability of retirement (no board seats) in 2004. ‘Titled 
Directors’ prestige’ is a continuous probability instrumented using variables correlated with the director's 
prestige described in the study. ‘Business Networks’ is the natural log of the number of senior 
management and board members the director has worked with including and prior to 2001. The ‘Highest 
degree’ is a discrete variable that takes the value of one for undergraduate, two for postgraduate and three 
for PhD. ‘Professional Qualifications’ is one if the director is affiliated with any professional bodies and 
zero otherwise. Government experience is a discrete variable that is unity if the director has worked for 
the government, while tenure over six years is unity if the director has sat on a board for more than six 
years. The age indicator takes the value of unity if the director is over 65, while company size is the book 
value of assets in 2001. ROA is the median industry adjusted return on assets while CAR is the stock 
price return of the company net of the market index for the 12 months prior to 2001. Figures in 
parentheses are the robust standard errors. '***', '**', and '*' refer to significance at the 99%, 95% and 
90% confidence intervals respectively. 
Independent Variables 
Number of 
Directorships 2004 
Probability of 
Retirement in 2004 
Titled Directors’ Prestige 0.917** -0.758* 
 (0.378) (0.454) 
Business Networks 0.072** 0.047 
 (0.031) (0.042) 
Highest Degree (B.A., M.A., or Ph.D.) 0.078** -0.098** 
 (0.04) (0.046) 
Professional Qualifications (1/0) 0.303*** -0.196** 
 (0.082) (0.100) 
Government Experience (1/0) -0.164 0.103 
 (0.115) (0.140) 
Tenure over 6 years (1/0) -0.246*** 0.287*** 
 (0.086) (0.097) 
Director’s Age is over 65 (1/0) -0.881*** 0.921*** 
 (0.103) (0.106) 
Log(Company Size) 0.019 0.007 
 (0.023) (0.029) 
ROA 0.281 -0.364 
 (0.182) (0.227) 
CARt-12 -0.014 -0.013 
 (0.070) (0.097) 
Number of Directorships in 2001  -0.402*** 
  (0.101) 
Wald χ2 142.04*** 146.99*** 
Pseudo Adjusted R2 0.0724 0.1156 
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Table IX - The Number of Outside Directorships and Director Titles; Directors Matched Sample  
The sample consists of outside directors that held at least one directorship in 2001 on the sample of U.K. 
firms. The Titled director sample consists of 162 outside directors with at least one title of Lord/Lady, 
Madam, Baroness, Sir/Dame, The Rt Hon., and Professor. The matched sample is constructed to find the 
closest comparable group of directors based on age, business network, firm size and educational background. 
The Tenure on board is the average number of years that the director has spent on their board as at 2001, 
while government experience is unity if the director has worked as part of a governmental organisation. 
Professional Qualifications is an indicator for directors that hold accredited qualifications. Figures in 
parentheses are standard errors. '***', '**', and '*' refer to significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% confidence 
intervals respectively. The difference in means test for dichotomous variables is the difference in proportions, 
for discrete interval data it is the Mann-Whitney Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test, while for continuous variables it 
is the two-tail t-test.  
  
Outside Directors 
with a Title 
Matched Sample 
Of Non-Titled 
Directors 
Difference in 
Mean / Proportion 
  162 162   
No. of Directorships (2001) 1.420 1.136 *** 
 (0.694) (0.410)  
No. of Chairmanships (2001) 0.321 0.167 *** 
 (0.607) (0.463)  
No. of Directorships (2004) 0.901 0.586 *** 
 (0.828) (0.656)  
Tenure on Board 5.975 5.027 * 
 (6.095) (3.857)  
Government Experience 0.469 0.160 *** 
 (0.501) (0.368)  
Professional Qualifications 0.321 0.340  
 (0.468) (0.475)  
Board Size 11.005 10.899  
 (3.15) (3.26)  
Matching Criteria    
Director's Age 62.574 62.111  
 (6.748) (6.526)  
Director's Business Network 94.679 93.802  
 (94.261) (95.502)  
Log(Company Size) 7.507 7.544  
 (1.810) (1.711)  
Number of Degrees 1.444 1.438  
  (1.022) (1.021)   
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Appendix Table - The Distribution of Titled Directors Across Industries 
The sample contains all independent outside directorships on the sample of U.K. firms in 2001 and 2004. Industry Classifications are made as per the SIC 
codes. Titled Directors are those with any title, political titles are 'Lord', 'Baroness' or 'The Rt Hon' while Sir titles are 'Sir' or 'Madam. Academic titles are 
'Professor' and include 'Dr' titles also. The significance intervals '***', '**', and '*' signify 99%, 95% and 90% significance respectively in a test of a difference 
in proportions relative to all other directors.  
 
All Outside 
Independent Directors Titled Directors Political title Sir Title Academic title 
SIC Classification N % N % N % N % N % 
Agriculture, forestry, & fishing (01-09) 8 0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mining (10-14) 130 5.4 34 6 7 6.9 15 6.6 12 4.9 
Construction (15-17) 136 5.7 15 2.7*** 5 5 6 2.6** 6 2.4** 
Manufacturing (20-39) 948 39.5 288 51*** 47 46.5 117 51.5*** 129 52.2*** 
Transportation & pub. utilities (40-49) 398 16.6 93 16.5 14 13.9 39 17.2 42 17 
Wholesale and Retail trade (50-59) 355 14.8 53 9.4*** 11 10.9 23 10.1** 19 7.7*** 
Services (70-89) 425 17.7 82 14.5** 17 16.8 27 11.9** 39 15.8 
Total Directorships 2400   565   101   227   247   
 
 
